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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintr{lub* and Alan N. Resnick**

THE TRUSTEE'S AVOIDING
POWERS AND CONDITIOf\IAL
ATTACHMENT LIENS-CAN TWO
PEOPLE WEAR THE $AME
SHOES?

A recent case in the Southern
District of New York, In re DeLancey ,.1 raises interesting ques~ions about a lien obtained by writ
of attachment when a bankruptcy
petition is filed before the lienor
obtains a money judgment against
the debtor.
DeLancey, the individual debtor,
was the principal of a corporation
involved in the. roofing business in
Allentown, Pennsylvania. In April
1984, Nazario, a creditor of both
the corporation and DeLancey,
commenced an action against Mr.
and Mrs. DeLancey and the corporation in federal district court to
· collect unpaid debts for materials
furnished. On the same day,
* Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crarnes, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy. Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead,
New York; Counsel to Berkman, Henoch,
Peterson, Kadin, Peddy & Scarcella, Garden City, New York; Member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
1 Case
No. 85-B-20100 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 20, 1988) (slip op.).
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Nazario caused a preliminary writ
of attachment to be levied against
certain equipment and proceeds
because the debtor was not served
personally with the summons and
complaint.
On May 11, 1984, another
creditor, United. States Fidelity &
Guaranty Company (USF&G),
filed fimincing statements under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to perfect a security
interest in the assets of Mr. and
Mrs. DeLancey. The financing
statements, as well as ajudgment
note, were filed as a result of
USF&G's issuance of payment
and performance bonds on behalf
of the debtor and the corporation.
When various creditors sued
both the debtor and the corporation in October 1984, the state
court ordered that certai~ equipment be sold and the proceeds
held in escrow by a bank pending
a determination of the relative
rights in the assets. On March 13,
1985, the Pennsylvania court held
that DeLancey, not the corporation, was the owner of the equipment that was sold. The proceeds
of the .sale held in escrow were
only $44,217, which was less than
the amount owed to Nazario and
only a small fraction of the sum
owed to USF&G.

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

DeLancey filed a bankruptcy
petition commencing a chapter 7
liquidatiop. case on March 5, 1985.
At that time, Nazario's attachment lien had priority, under
Pennsylvania law, over the subsequently perfected lien of
USF&G. If bankruptcy had not
ensued and Nazario had eventually obtained a money judgment in
its action, Nazario's priority over
USF&G would have enabled
Nazario to collect the entire escrow fund. However, state law
provides that a lien obtained by
order of attachment is inchoate
and condit'ional on obtaining a
money judgment. If a judgment
cannot be obtained, the conditional lien is dissolved. 2 Under
these facts, what are the relative
rights of the parties as to the proceeds of the equipment held in the
escrow fund?

clause, because the lien·was "noperfected" in that it ~as conditional on obtaining a money'judgment that cannot be .obtained
because of the bankruptcy. Thus,
the attachment lien ~ssolved and,
according to the trustee's argument, the trustee niay preserve
the attachment lien fot the benefit
of the estate under Section 551.of
the Code. 4 The result of this reasoning, according to the trustee, is
that the trustee stands in the priority position of Nazario and defeats
the junior security interesf of
USF&G.
Summary judgment was denied
in part bec~use of factual issues
that had ·to be resolved, but the
bankruptcy court granted partiat
summary judgment to the extent
that the bank was directed to tum
over the escrow funds to the
trustee. 5 Although the co~rt did
gard to any knowledge of the trustee, or
of -any creditor, the ri&hts and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable by
(1) a creditor that e)(tends credit to the
debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and that obtains, at such
time and with respect to such credit, a
judicial lien on all property on which a
creditor on a simple contract could have
obtained such a judicial lien, whether or
not such a creditor exi~ts ....

Relative Rights of the Parties

This question was first raised in
the context of a motion for summary judgment by the trustee in
connection with his turnover action against the bank to recover
the escrow funds. The trustee argued that Nazario's attachment
lien was voidable under Section
544(a)(l) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 3 the· so-called strong-arm

4

11 U.S.C. 551 provides:

2 See In re Savidge, 57 Bankr. 389, 391
(D. Del. 1986).
3 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) provides:

Any transfer avoided under section 522,
544, 545, 547; 548, 549, or 724(a) of this
title, or any lien void 'under section
506(d) of this title, is pres~rved for the·
benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of the estate.

The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without re-

sIn re DeLancey, 77 Bankr. 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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not resolve the priority dispute
between the trustee and USF&G,
it did confirm that Nazario's lien
was inchoate or unconditional because it did not obtain a money
judgment.
In a subsequent· motion to reclassify the claim ofUSF&G as an
unsecured claim, the trustee againtook the position that Sections
5M(a)(l) and 551 allow the trustee
to avoid the "unperfected" inchoate attachment lien while preserving it for benefit of the estate,
thereby giving the trustee priority
over USF&G's lien.
In response, USF&G argued
that the inchoate or conditional at.:
tachment lien of Nazario is dissolved and therefore unavailable
for preservation under Section
551. USF&G contended that the
trustee is .subrogated under Section 551 to the unsecured status of
Nazario's inch~ate or conditional
lien which was "unperfected"
and dissolved because no money
judgment was entered in favor of
Nazario prior to bankruptcy.
Since the trustee may not preserve Nazario's lien for the benefit of the estate, according to
USF&G' s argument, its perfected
security interest became the
senior lien that is effective against
the trustee.
The bankruptcy court noted
that the rationale behind the automatic preservation of avoided
liens pursuant to Section 55i is
that "the estate should benefit
from eacli avoidance rather than
90
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promoting the priority of unavoidable junior secured interests
who would otherwise improve
tpeir positions at the expense of
the estate. " 6
The court pointed out, however, that the trustee's rights resulting from preservation of the
avoided lien are not without limitation.
[T]he trustee who avoids and then
preserves a senior secured claim
cannot acquire greater rights in the
property in question than those to
which the ~rustee succeeded ....
Thus, when under state law, the
avoided lien which is sought to be
preserved is inferior to subsequent
valid liens, the inferior lien cannot
be enhanced by its preservation
under 11 U.S.C. § 551. If the
avoided lien will sink below other
liens ~gainst the estate, the trustee
who stands in the shoes of the inferior avoided Jien will likewise
sink whjle in those shoes, because
11 U.S.C. § 551 does not create a
floating lien for trustees. 7

Focusing on the status of
Nazario's attachment lien on the
date on which tl;te debtor filed the
bankruptcy petition, which is
when the trustee's strong-arm
powers arise under Section
544(a), the bankruptcy court concluded that Nazario held a "valid
unperfected
attachment lien
which was superior to USF&G's

6

7

In re DeLancey, slip op. at 6.
Id.
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subsequent in time lien which was·
perfected by filed UCC Financing
Statements.'' 8
The conclusion, that Nazario's
lien had priority over USF&G's
security interest under Pennsylvania law led to the next question:
What effect did the bankruptcy
petition have on the attachment
lien?
Effect of Bankruptcy. Petition on
Attachment Lien

The bankruptcy court found the
district court decision in In re
Savidge 9 helpful in its analysis.
The attachment lien in Savidge
was inchoate when the debtor
filed a bankruptcy petition and a
subsequent judicial lien creditor,
not the trustee, objected to the secured status of the attachment
lienor in the bankruptcy case. The
attachment lienor argued that Section 546(b) of the Code allowed it
to "perfect" the inchoate attachment lien after the debtor filed the
bankruptcy petition. Pursuant to
Section 546(b), the trustee's
avoiding powers under Sections
544, 545, and 549 of the Code are
"subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of
an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires
rights in such property before the
date of such perfection.'' By ob-

8

ld. at 7.
In re Savidge, 57 Bankr. 389 (D. Del.
1986).
9
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taining a money judgment after
bankruptcy, the attachment lienor
will "perfect" the lien and the attachment lienor's priority will
date back to the prebankrqptcy
time when the attachment lien
was first obtained. Thus, upon
such perfection the attachment
lien becomes unavoidable as
against the trustee. Moreover,
Section 362(b)(3) provides an ex:
ception to the automatic stay to
permit postpetition perfection of a
lien to the extent that the trustee's
avoiding powers are subject to
Section. 546(b).
The district court in Savidge rejected these arguments and held
that the bankruptcy discharge of
the debt owed to the attachment
lienor made it impo~sible for the
lienor to ever obtain a money
judgment against the debtor.
Therefore, the inchoate .attachment ·lien could never be perfected and, under state law, it dissolved. The attachment lienpr
must be treated as an unsecured
creditor. The district court also
held that Section 546(b) was inapplicable to perfection of an attachment lien designed solely to
secure jurisdiction.
We hold that this type of unperfected lien, created by ITI's writ_ of
domestic attachment in order to
compel the appearance of the defendant and · wholly dependent
upon the subsequent recovery of a
judgment on the attachment process, is not the type of "interest in
property" which can be perfected
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tied to a discharge of any debts
because of his failure to keep or
The bankruptcy court in De- preserve records>from which his
Lancey did not discuss the rejec- financial condition might be ascertion of the Savidge holding by the tained and for failure to explain
14
Court of Appeals for the Ninth satisfactorily a loss of assets.
Circuit in In re Wind Power Sys- Therefore, Nazario was free to
tems, Inc.U The court of appeals obtain a money judgment after the
bankruptcy case and, once obstated as follows:
tained, the attachment lien would
[T]he Savidge opinion cites no case ripen into a judgment lien that
have
priority
over
law in support of its conclusion, would
and the logic of its application by USF&G's security interest and
the bankruptcy court would also the trustee's hypothetical judicial
overturn a strong line of cases in lien created by Section 544(a)(l).
this ~ourt allowing prepreference Although the bankruptcy court
lien creditors to proceed to judg- did not mention Section 546(b),
ment [citations omitted) .... As a
that section should leave no doubt
matter of policy, the Savidge result
is undesirable. Had the Savidge that the trustee's rights under
creditor been allowed to proceed to the Section 544(a)(l) strong-arm
judgment, it would have taken clause are subject to Nazario's
priority over the trustee's judicial ability to perfect the inchoate atlien. The bankruptcy court's result tachment lien by obtaining the
·provides an incentive for strategic postpetition judgment. Moreover,
bankruptcy filings which distort the automatic stay should not
rights among creditors from what interfere with Nazario's action to
they would be outside bankruptcy obtain the judgment because of
proceedings. 12
the exception contained in SecThe bankruptcy court in De- tion 362(b)(3).
Lancey, by not following the
The court in DeLancey correctWind decision, in essence rejected ly held that the trustee may not
the court of appeals's view that a use Section 551 to preserve
"conditional attachment" ·lien Nazario's attachment lien for the
could be effective even if the un- benefit of the estate and to reduce
derlying claim is discharged. In a USF&G's status to that of an unprevious decision, 13 the court secured creditor. "In the event
held that DeLancey was not enti- that Nazario obtains a judgment
against the nondischarged debtor,
10 ld. at 391.
such lien will ripen into a vested
11 841 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1988).
lien to the extent of the attached
under Section 546(b) after the
debtor files for bankruptcy. 10

841 F.2d at 293.
In re DeLancey, 58 Bankr. 762
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
12
13

14
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See 11 U,S.C. §§ 727 (a)(3), 727(a)(5).
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funds. Manifestly, the trustee may
not stand in Nazario's shoes to
9efeat perfected lien creditors
who are junior to Nazario." 1 s
Conclusion
Although we agree with the
court's holding and analysis, we
nonetheless question the metaphor used by the court to explain
its reasoning:
Unfortunately for the trustee,
Nazario's shoes are too large for
his feet. . . . Although the trustee
has attempted to try on Nazario's
shoes in order to preserve assets
for the benefit of unsecured creditors, this court finds that the shoes
don't fit. This finding is consistent
with the old maxim that the same
shoe does not fit every foot. 16

But we believe th~t Nazario's
shoes would fit the trustee. The
denial of discharge means that
Nazario could and would continue
to recover a money judgment
against DeLancey regardless of
the existence of the attachment
lien. Even unsecured creditors
pursue judgments against a nondischarged debtor. In any event,
once a money judgment is obtained, the attachment lien would
have priority over USF&G's perfected security interest under
ts In re DeLancey, slip op. at 10.
ld.

16

state law. If permitted to do so,
the trustee would dance very
nicely in those shoes to reduce
USF&G to unsecured creditor
status. The shoes would fit well.
It is more accurate to say thatthe Bankruptcy Code limits the
trustee's right to wear 1Nazario's
shoes to ascertain whet)ler or not
they fit. Since Nazario may continue to pursue a judgment to
"perfect" its lien; and ,the ripened
lien will have priority over a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor
who obtained the judicial lien on
the date of bankruptcy, there is no
basis under the Code for avoidance of Nazario's lien unless
Nazario fails to obtain .a judgment. In essence, the trustee's
strong-arm power under Section
544(a)q) does not provide the
strength needed to remove
Nazario from its shoes. If there is
no basis for avoiding the lien
under the Code, Section 551 has
no application and does,not allow
the trustee to preserve the lien for
the benefit of the estate. Whether
or not Nazario's shoes fit the
trustee, the trustee may not wear
them as long ,as Nazario is still
wearing--them.
Perhaps a more accurate picture of the court's reasoning in
DeLancey could have been painted with the comment that "one
pair of shoes cannot be worn by
two people at the same time."
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